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Built around the law, and measured

GDPR, EDPB 01/2025 guidelines, AI Act, professional secrecy, eIDAS: the rules on one side, the proof on the other. Both are public.

The law, applied by design

GDPR · AI Act

Compliance by design

Reversible, logged pseudonymisation within the meaning of Art. 4(5); a technical measure under Art. 32; a documented and owned AI Act positioning.

GDPR & AI Act (in French) →
EDPB

01/2025 guidelines

Our honest reading, point by point: separation of additional information, the singling-out criterion, what we don't cover yet.

EDPB 01/2025 (in French) →
Best practice

Pseudonymising, properly

What "pseudonymise" really means in law, and how it differs from a document made unrecognisable to everyone, including you.

Best practice (in French) → What pseudonymise really means (in French) →
INPI

Patented technology

FR2607944 (case file consistent over time, Mode 3) · FR2609690 (express lane).

Patents (in French) →

AI Act: high-risk, owned since 2 August 2026

Software that detects identities with AI on personal data falls under Annex III. We do not dodge the classification: we answer it article by article.

ArticleObligationAnswer
Art. 6 + Annex IIIHigh-risk classification of systems that identify peopleClassification owned; AI capabilities documented, configurable, supervisable
Art. 12Automatic logging of eventsSealed log, SHA-256 hash-chained, strict numbering, retained locally
Art. 14Effective human oversightDetections proposed, never imposed; every correction tracked; validation mandatory before AI transmission (lightened only on the express lane)
Art. 26Deployer obligations: compliant use, oversight, log retentionTwo-level AI log (observed by the checkpoint / declared by the AI), signed PDF export
Art. 4 and 50Mastery of AI, transparencyBuilt-in help centre, manual, published doctrine of limits

Professional secrecy: where the cloud, even a French one, does not hold

The question is not only "where is the data hosted" but "who was able to read the exhibit". Three regimes stack up, and apply before any pseudonymisation if the clear-text exhibit goes to a third party.

RegimeRuleScopeConsequence for a checkpoint held by a third party
General secrecyArt. 226-13 and 226-14 CPAnyone bound by status, profession, function or missionThe data centre is a third party; a DPA is a contract, art. 226-13 is criminal law
Investigation and inquiryArt. 11 CPP (Act 2021-1729) referring to art. 434-7-2 CPAnyone taking part in the proceedings, including the court-appointed expertUp to 3, 5 or 7 years depending on the case, triple general secrecy: an upload is a disclosure
Regulated professionsArt. 66-5 Act of 1971; art. 244 CPC; art. L.1110-4 and L.1111-8 CSP; art. L.511-33 CMF; ord. 45-2138 art. 21; CGFP L.121-6Lawyers, experts, physicians, bankers, chartered accountants, public officialsHDS hosting frames the host; it does not exempt the professional from their own secrecy obligation
Checkpoint reading. A checkpoint delocalised to a third party receives the clear-text exhibit to transform it: secrecy is broken before pseudonymisation even exists. LexLabs pseudonymises before anything leaves the workstation. Professional secrecy in detail (in French) →

Precision, measured and published

The coverage indices by language and by tier, the method note and the published limits live on the Proof page.

Proof

Effectiveness, measured every night

Six countries, three tiers, versioned and adversarial baselines: any regression blocks publication. What few vendors publish, together with what the proof does not prove yet.

See the measurements and the chain of proof →
eIDAS

Qualified timestamping

An RFC 3161 token from a qualified provider on the log anchor: legal presumption of date (eIDAS art. 42). Awaiting the key ceremony, stated as such.

The nine links →

Building a compliance file?

Art. 30 register, assisted DPIA, a processing sheet on every export: the GDPR pack is a licence module.

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